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THE MATHEMATIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SCIENCES -
REVISITED
BERNHELM BOOSS-BAVNBEK
Abstract. We recall major findings of a systematic investigation of the math-
ematization of the individual sciences, conducted by the author in Bielefeld
some 35 years ago under the direction of Klaus Krickeberg, and confront them
with recent developments in physics, medicine, economics, and spectral geom-
etry.
Dedicated to Klaus Krickeberg on his 80th birthday
Introduction - recollections
In the years 1972-75, a small working group on The mathematization of the in-
dividual sciences was organized by Klaus Krickeberg and myself at the then young
West-German university of Bielefeld. The group included representatives of all the
disciplines represented at the university. Unfortunately, the engineering and the
medical sciences were not represented, so that the important questions of math-
ematization of industrial production and health care were not addressed.
To my knowledge it was the first systematic investigation of the mathematization
as seen from the individual sciences. The term mathematization was directed both
to the shining modelling aspects (= selecting, finding, inventing the right specifica-
tion, equations and set-up) and the rather profane tasks of executing the necessary
calculations (= parameter estimations, analytic solutions, numerical simulations,
approximations, stability/deformation/robustness arguments, and geometric inter-
pretations). The investigation remained a singularity in its multi-disciplinary, al-
most all-embracing ambition. It was based on extensive literature study and a long
series of hearings and interviews. It was, and perhaps continues to be an offence
against two traditional imperatives of scientific research: Don’t mix ! and Origi-
nality first ! We were continuously comparing - and confronting - different sciences
with each other and with their mathematization experiences, looking forth and
back, mixing continuously mathematical, methodological, epistemological, educa-
tional, and ethical questions. More offending, we were not interested in the most
recent top-notch results, but in the relevance of the applied mathematical methods
for advances in the individual sciences, and in the question of what the cases were
representative for.
On the initiative of the wizard Alexander Ostrowski (1893-1986), Krickeberg and
I collected some of our findings in a volume and published it with Birkha¨user in
Basel in 1976, [BoKr76], see also [Bo79] for a summary report.
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1. Continuing challenges
The use of mathematical arguments, first in pre-scientific investigations, then
in other sciences, foremost in medicine and astronomy and in their shared border
region astrology, has been traced way back in history by many authors from various
perspectives, Bernal [Be54], Høyrup [Ho04], and Kline [Kl74].
Globally speaking, they all agree on three mathematization tendencies:
(1) The progress in the individual sciences makes work on ever more compli-
cated problems possible and necessary.
(2) This accumulation of problems and data demands conscious, planned, and
economic procedures in the individual sciences, i.e., an increased emphasis
on questions of methodology.
(3) Finally, this increased emphasis on questions of methodology is as a rule
associated with the tendency of mathematization.
All of this applies generally. In detail, we find many various pictures. In his
Groundplat of Sciences and Artes, Mathematicall of 1570 [De70], the English al-
chemist, astrologer, and mathematician John Dee, the first man to defend the
Copernican theory in Britain and a consultant on navigation, pointed out, in best
Aristotelian tradition, that it is necessary in the evaluation of mathematization to
pay strict attention to the specific characteristics of the application area in ques-
tion. He postulated a dichotomy between the Principall side, pure mathematics,
and the Deriuative side, i.e., applied mathematics and mathematization. He then
classified the applications of pure mathematics according to objects treated:
• Ascending Application in thinges Supernaturall, eternall and Diuine,
• In thinges Mathematicall: Without farther Applications,
and finally, on the lowest and most vulgar plane in the Aristotelian scheme,
• Descending Application in thinges Naturall: both Substantiall & Acciden-
tall, Visible & Inuisible & c..
Now that history has excluded matters divine from mathematics, we can with some
justification ask whether later generations may regard with equal amusement and
astonishment the fact that in our time there are a large number of professional
mathematicians, who are completely satisfied with spending their entire lives work-
ing in the second, inner mathematical level and who persistently refuse to descend
to vulgar applications.
The panorama of the individual sciences and the role that mathematics had to
play in them was perfectly clear for John Dee. In our time the matter is somewhat
more complex. In this review, I cannot point out a geodetically perfect picture of
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today’s landscape of mathematization. I must treat the matter rather summar-
ily. A summary treatment may have the advantage that in comparison among the
mathematization progress in three sciences below (physics, medicine and econom-
ics), common problems on one hand and special features of mathematization on
the other hand can be seen more clearly.
In the following, I shall “ascend” from the study of dead nature in physics, the
field which has the highest degree of mathematization on any chosen scale, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, over the investigation of living matter in medicine,
the field where one might expect the greatest mathematization advances in our
century, to the treatment of financial issues and decision making for commerce
and production in economics, a field of questionable scientific state, that, beyond
well founded actuary estimations, lacks unambiguous results and convincing clear
perspectives regarding mathematization.
2. Physics
The intimate connection between mathematics and physics makes it difficult
to determine the theoretical relevance of mathematics and obscures the boundary
between genuinely physical thought and observation on one side and the character-
istically mathematical contribution on the other side. Recall Hilbert’s perception
of probability theory as a chapter of physics in his famous 6th Problem [Hi00]:
6. Mathematical Treatment of the Axioms of Physics. The investigations
on the foundations of geometry suggest the problem: To treat in the same
manner, by means of axioms, those physical sciences in which already today
mathematics plays an important part; in the first rank are the theory of prob-
abilities and mechanics.
To say it mildly, as Gnedenko did in his comments to the Russian edition of 1969:
Today this viewpoint (to consider probability theory as a chapter of physics) is no
longer so common as it was around the turn of the century, since the independent
mathematical content of the theory of probabilities has sufficiently clearly showed
since then... With hindsight and in view of the still challenging foundational prob-
lems of quantum mechanics, however, we may accept that parts of mathematics
and physics can be interlaced in a non-separable way.
Another famous example of that inextricable interlacement is provided by the
Peierls-Frisch memorandum of 1940 to the British Government: suggested by the
codiscoverer of fission Otto Frisch, the physicist Rudolph Peierls, like Frisch a
refugee in Britain, made the decisive feasibility calculation that not tons (as -
happily - erroneously estimated by Heisenberg in the service of the Nazis) but only
about 1 kg (later corrected to 6 kg) of the pure fissile isotope U235 would be needed
to make the atomic bomb. Was it mathematics or physics? It may be worth men-
tioning that Peierls was a full professor at the University of Birmingham since 1937
and became joint head of mathematics there, [Ed96]. Theoretical physics in Britain
is often in mathematics. As a matter of fact, physics in our sense did not exist as a
single science before the nineteenth century. There were well-defined experimental
physics comprising heat, magnetism, electricity and colour, leaving mechanics in
mathematics, see [Ho04, p. 493].
In spite of that intermingling, physics can provide a filter for our review, a
ready system of categories to distinguish different use of mathematics in different
modelling situations. Perhaps, the situation can be best compared with the role
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of physics in general education: after all, physics appears as the model of math-
ematization: there is no physics without mathematics - and, as a matter of fact,
learning of mathematics is most easy in a physics context: calculation by letters;
the various concepts of a function (table, graph, operation) and its derivatives and
anti-derivatives; differential equations; the concept of observational errors and the
corresponding estimations and tests of hypotheses; Brownian movements; all these
concepts can be explained context-free or in other contexts (where some of the
concepts actually originated), but they become clearest in the ideally simple ap-
plications of physics, which are sufficiently complicated to see the superiority of
the mathematization as compared to feelings, qualitative arguments, discussions,
convictions, imagination - but simple enough to get through.
2.1. Variety of modelling purposes. It may be helpful to distinguish the fol-
lowing modelling purposes:
2.1.1. Production of data, model based measurements. Clearly, the public associates
the value of mathematical modelling foremost to its predictive power, e.g., in nu-
merical weather prediction, and its prescriptive power, e.g., in the design of the
internal ballistics of the hydrogen bomb; more flattering to mathematicians, the
explanatory power of mathematization and its contribution to theory development
yield the highest reputation within the field. However, to the progress of physics,
the descriptive role, i.e., supporting model-based measurements in the laboratory,
is – as hitherto – the most decisive contribution of mathematics. Visco-elastic
constants and phase transition processes of glasses and other soft materials can
not be measured directly. For high precision in the critical region, one measures
electric currents through a “dancing” piezoelectric disc with fixed potential and
varying frequency. In this case, solving mathematical equations from the fields
of electro-dynamics and thermo-elasticity becomes mandatory for the design of the
experiments and the interpretation of the data. In popular terms, one may speak of
a mathematical microscope, in technical terms of a transducer that becomes useful
as soon as we understand the underlying mathematical equations.
2.1.2. Simulation. Once a model is found and verified and the system’s parameters
are estimated for one domain, one has the hope of doing computer calculations to
predict what new experiments in new domains (new materials, new temperatures
etc) should see. Rightly, one has given that type of calculations a special name
of honour, computer simulations: as a rule, it requires to run the process on a
computer or a network of computers under quite sophisticated conditions: typically,
the problem is to bring the small distances and time intervals of well-understood
molecular dynamics up to reasonable macroscopic scales, either by aggregation or
by Monte Carlo methods – as demonstrated by Buffon’s needle casting for the
numerical approximation of pi.
One should be aware that the word “simulation” has, for good and bad, a con-
nation derived from NASA’s space simulators and Nintendo’s war games and juke
boxes. Animations and other advanced computer simulations can display an im-
pressive beauty and convincing power. That beauty, however, is often their dark
side: simulations can show a deceptive similarity with true observations, so in com-
putational fluid dynamics when the numerical solution of the Bernoulli equations,
i.e., the linearization of the Navier-Stokes equations for laminar flow displays eddies
characteristic for the non-linear flow. The eddies do not originate from real energy
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loss due to friction and viscosity but from hardly controllable hardware and soft-
ware properties, the chopping of digits, thus providing a magic realism, as coined
by Abbott and Larsen [AbLa85]. In numerical simulation, like in mathematical
statistics, results which fit our expectations too nicely, must awake our vigilance
instead of being taken as confirmation.
2.1.3. Prediction. As shown in the preceding subsection, there is no sharp boundary
between description and prediction. However, the quality criteria for predictions are
quite simple: do things develop and show up as predicted? So, for high precision
astrology and longitudinal determination in deep-sea shipping the astronomical
tables of planetary movement, based on the outdated and falsified Ptolemaic system
(the Resolved Alfonsine Tables) and only modestly corrected in the Prutenic Tables
of 1551 were, until the middle of the 17th century, rightly considered as more reliable
than Kepler’s heliocentric Rudolphine Tables, as long as they were more precise -
no matter on what basis, see, Steele [St00, p. 128].
Almost unnoticed, we have had a similar revolution in weather prediction in
recent years: the (i) analogy (synoptic) methods of identifying a similarly looking
weather situation in the weather card archives to base the extrapolation on it were
replaced by almost pure (ii) numerical methods to derive the prediction solely from
the thermodynamic and hydrodynamic basic equations and conservation laws, ap-
plied to initial conditions extracted from the observation grid. “Almost” because
the uncertainty of the interpolation of the grid and the high sensitivity of the
evolution equations to initial conditions obliges to repeated runs with small per-
turbations and human inspection and selection of the most “probable” outcome
like in (i). That yields sharp estimates about the certainty of the prediction for a
range of up to 10 days. In nine of ten cases, the predictions are surprisingly reliable
and would have been impossible to obtain by traditional methods. However, a 10%
failure rate would be considered unacceptable in industrial quality control.
In elementary particle physics, the coincidence of predictions with measurements
is impressive, but also disturbing. I quote from Smolin [Sm06, pp. 12-13]:
Twelve particles and four forces are all we need to explain everything in the
known world. We also understand very well the basic physics of these particles
and forces. This understanding is expressed in terms of a theory that accounts
for all these particles and all of the forces except for gravity. It’s called the
standard model of elementary-particle physics - or the standard model for
short. . . . Anything we want to compute in this theory we can, and it results
in a finite number. In the more than thirty years since it was formulated,
many predictions made by this theory have been checked experimentally. In
each and every case, the theory has been confirmed.
The standard model was formulated in the early 1970s. Except for the
discovery that neutrinos have mass, it has not required adjustment since. So
why wasn’t physics over by 1975? What remained to be done?
For all its usefulness, the standard model has a big problem: It has a long
list of adjustable constants. . . .
We feel pushed back to the pre-Keplerian, pre-Galilean and pre-Newtonian cos-
mology built on ad-hoc assumptions, displaying clever and deceptive mathematics-
based similarity between observations and calculations – and ready to fall at any
time because the basic assumptions are not explained.
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Perhaps the word deceptive is inappropriate when speaking of description, sim-
ulation and prediction: for these tasks, similarity can rightly be considered as the
highest value obtainable, as long one stays in a basically familiar context. From
a semiotic angle, the very similarity must have a meaning and is indicating some-
thing; from a practical angle, questions regarding the epistemological status can
often be discarded as metaphysical exaggerations: who cares about the theoretical
or ad-hoc basis of a time schedule in public transportation – as long as the train
leaves on time!
2.1.4. Control. The prescriptive power of mathematization deserves a more criti-
cal examination. In physics and engineering we may distinguish between the (a)
feasibility, the (b) efficiency, and the (c) safety of a design. A design can be an
object like an airplane or a circuit diagram for a chip, an instrument like a digital
thermometer, TV set, GPS receiver or pacemaker, or a regulated process like a
feed-back regulation of the heat in a building, the control of a power station or
the precise steering of a radiation canon in breast cancer therapy. Mathematics
has its firm footing for testing (a) in thought experiments, estimations of process
parameters, simulations and solving equations. For testing (b), a huge inventory is
available of mathematical quality control and optimisation procedures by variation
of key parameters.
It seems to me, however, that (c), i.e., safety questions provide the greatest math-
ematical challenges. They appear differently in (i) experience-based, (ii) science-
based and (iii) science-integrated design. In (i), mathematics enters mostly in the
certification of the correctness of the design copy and the quality test of the per-
formance. In (ii), well-established models and procedures have to be modified and
re-calculated for a specific application. Experienced physicists and engineers, how-
ever, seldom trust their calculations and adaptations. Too many parameters may be
unknown and pop-up later: Therefore, in traditional railroad construction, a small
bridge was easily calculated and built, but then photogrammetrically checked when
removing the support constructions. A clash of more than δcrit required re-building.
Similarly, even the most carefully calculated chemical reactors and other containers
under pressure and heat have their prescribed “Soll-Bruchstelle” (supposed line of
fracture) in case that something is going wrong.
The transition from (ii) to (iii) is the most challenging: very seldom one intro-
duces a radically new design in the physics laboratory or engineering endeavour.
But there are systems where all components and functions can be tested separately
but the system as a whole can only be tested in situ: a new design of a Diesel
ship engine; a car, air plane or space craft; a new concept in cryptography. In all
these cases, one is tempted to look and even to advocate for mathematical proofs
of the safe function according to specification. Unfortunately, in most cases these
“proofs” belong rather to the field of fiction than to rigorous mathematics. For an
interesting discussion on “proofs” in cryptography (a little remote from physics) see
the debate between Koblitz and opponents in [Ko08] and follow-ups in the Notices
of the American Mathematical Society.
An additional disturbing aspect of science-integrated technology development is
the danger of a loss of transparency. Personally, I must admit, I’m grateful for
most black-box systems. I have no reason to complain when something in my
computer is hidden for my eyes, as long everything functions as it shall or can
easily be re-tuned. However, for the neighbourhood of a chemical plant (and the
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reputation of the company) it may be better not to automatize everything but to
keep some aspects of the control non-mathematized and in the hands of the service
crew to avoid de-qualification and to keep the crew able to handle non-predictable
situations.
A last important aspect of the prescriptive power of the mathematization is its
formatting power for thought structure and social behaviour. It seems that there
is not so much to do about it besides being aware of the effects.
2.1.5. Explain phenomena. The noblest role of mathematical concepts in physics is
to explain phenomena. Einstein did it when reducing the heat conduction to molec-
ular diffusion, starting from the formal analogy of Fick’s Law with the cross section
of Brownian motion. He did it also when generalizing the Newtonian mechanics
into the special relativity of constant light velocity and again when unifying forces
and curvature in general relativity.
Roughly speaking, mathematical models can serve physics by reducing new phe-
nomena to established principles; as heuristic devices for suitable generalizations
and extensions; and as “a conceptual scheme in which the insights . . . fit together”
(C. Rovelli). Further below we shall return to the last aspect – the unification hope.
Physics history has not always attributed the best credentials to explaining phe-
nomena by abstract constructions. It has discarded the concept of a ghost for
perfect explanation of midnight noise in old castles; the concept of ether for ex-
plaining the finite light velocity; the phlogiston for burning and reduction processes,
the Ptolemaic epicycles for planetary motion. It will be interesting to see in the
years to come whether the mathematically advanced String Theory or the recent
Connes-Marcolli reformulation of the Standard Model in terms of spectral triples
will undergo the same fate.
2.1.6. Theory development. Finally, what has been the role of mathematical con-
cepts and mathematical beauty for the very theory development in physics? One
example is Johann Bernoulli’s purely aesthetic confirmation of Galilean fall law
s = g/2 t2 among a couple of candidates as being the only one providing the same
equation (shape) for his brachistochrone and Huygens’ tautochrone, [Be97, p. 395]:
Before I end I must voice once more the admiration that I feel for the unex-
pected identity of Huygens tautochrone and my brachystochrone. I consider it
especially remarkable that this coincidence can take place only under the hy-
pothesis of Galilei, so that we even obtain from this a proof of its correctness.
Nature always tends to act in the simplest way, and so it here lets one curve
serve two different functions, while under any other hypothesis we should need
two curves.
Another, more prominent example is the lasting triumph of Maxwell’s equa-
tions: a world of radically new applications were streaming out of the beauty and
simplicity of the equations of electro-magnetic waves!
However, not every mathematical, theoretical and empirical accumulation leads
to theory development. Immediately after discovering the high-speed rotation of
the Earth around its own axis, a spindle shape of the Earth was suggested and an
infinitesimal tapering towards the North pole confirmed in geodetic measurements
around Paris. Afterwards, careful control measurements of the gravitation at the
North Cap and at the Equator suggested the opposite, namely an ellipsoid shape
with flattened poles. Ingenious mathematical mechanics provided a rigorous reason
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for that. Gauss and his collaborator Listing, however, found something different in
their control. They called the shape gleichsam wellenfo¨rmig and dropped the idea
of a theoretically satisfactory description. Since then we speak of a Geoid.
2.2. “The trouble with physics”. That is the title of an interesting and well-
informed polemic by Lee Smolin against String Theory and present main stream
physics at large. He notices a stagnation in physics, so much promise, so little
fulfillment [Sm06, p. 313], a predominance of anti-foundational spirit and contempt
for visions, partly related to the mathematization paradigm of the 1970s, according
to Smolin: Shut up and calculate.
It seems to me that Smolin, basically, may be right. Børge Jessen, the Copen-
hagen mathematician and close collaborator of Harald Bohr once suggested to dis-
tinguish in sciences and mathematics between periods of expansion and periods of
consolidation. Clearly physics had a consolidation period in the first half of the
20th century with relativity and quantum mechanics. The same may be true for
biology with the momentous triumph of the DNA disclosure around 1950, while,
to me, the mathematics of that period is characterized by an almost chaotic ex-
pansion in thousands of directions. Following that way of looking, mathematics of
the second half of the 20th century is characterized by an enormous consolidation,
combining so disparate fields like partial differential equations and topology in in-
dex theory, integral geometry and probability in point processes, number theory,
statistical mechanics and cryptography, etc. etc. A true period of consolidation
for mathematics, while - at least from the outside - one can have the impression
that physics and biology of the second half of the 20th century were characterized
merely by expansion, new measurements, new effects - and almost total absence of
consolidation or, at least failures and vanity of all trials in that direction.
Indeed, there have been impressive successes in recent physics, in spite of the
absence of substantial theoretical progress in physics: perhaps the most spectac-
ular and for applications most important discovery has been the High Tempera-
ture Superconducting (HTS) property of various ceramic materials by Bednorz and
Mu¨ller - seemingly without mathematical or theoretical efforts but only by system-
atic combinatorial variation of experiments - in the tradition of the old alchemists,
[BeMu87].
The remarkable advances in fluid dynamics, weather prediction, oceanography,
climatic modelling are mainly related to new observations and advances in computer
power while the equations have been studied long before.
Nevertheless, I noticed a turn to theory among young experimental physicists
in recent years, partly related to investigating the energy landscapes in material
sciences, partly to the re-discovery of the interpretational difficulties of quantum
mechanics in recent quantum optics.
2.3. Theory – model – experiment. Physics offers an extremely useful practi-
cal distinction between theory, model and experiments. From his deep insight in
astronomy, computing, linguistics and psychology, Peter Naur ridicules such dis-
tinctions as “metaphysical exaggeration” in [Na95]. He may be right. We certainly
should not exaggerate the distinction. In this review, however, the distinction helps
to focus on differences of the role of mathematics in doing science.
2.3.1. First principles. By definition, the very core of modelling is mathematics.
Moreover, if alone by the stochastic character of observations, but also due to the
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need to understand the mathematics of all transducers involved in measurements,
mathematics has its firm stand with experiments. First principles, however, have a
different status: they do not earn their authority from the elegance of being math-
ematically wrapped, but from the almost infinite repetition of similar and, as well
disparate observations connected to the same principle(s). In the first principles,
mathematics and physics meet almost on eye level: first principles are also estab-
lished - like mathematics, and are only marginally questioned. To me, the problem
with the pretended eternal authority of first principles is that new cosmological
work indicates that the laws of nature may also have undergone some develop-
ment; that there might have “survived” some evolutionary relicts; and that we had
better be prepared to be confronted under extreme experimental conditions, with
phenomena and relations which fall out of the range of accredited first principles.
The canonical candidate for such a relict is the Higgs particle, whether already
observed or not, see Holger Bech Nielsen’s contributions on the Quantum Gravity
Assessment Workshop 2008, [BEL08].
2.3.2. Towards a taxonomy of models. Not necessarily for the credibility of math-
ematical models, but for the way to check the range of credibility, the following
taxonomy of models may be extremely useful.
The Closing Round Table of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Mad-
rid, August 22-29, 2006) was devoted to the topic Are pure and applied mathematics
drifting apart? As panellist, Yuri Manin subdivided the mathematization, i.e., the
way mathematics can tell us something about the external world, into three modes
of functioning (similarly Bohle, Booß and Jensen 1983, [BBJ84], see also [Bo91]):
An (ad-hoc, empirically based) mathematical model “describes a certain range
of phenomena, qualitatively or quantitatively, but feels uneasy pretending to be
something more.” Manin gives two examples for the predictive power of such mod-
els, Ptolemy’s model of epicycles describing planetary motions of about 150 BCE,
and the standard model of around 1960 describing the interaction of elementary
particles, besides legions of ad-hoc models which hide lack of understanding behind
a more or less elaborated mathematical formalism of organizing available data.
A mathematically formulated theory is distinguished from an ad-hoc model pri-
marily by its “higher aspirations. A theory, so to speak, is an aristocratic model.”
Theoretically substantiated models, such as Newton’s mechanics, are not neces-
sarily more precise than ad-hoc models; the coding of experience in the form of a
theory, however, allows a more flexible use of the model, since its embedding in a
theory universe permits a theoretical check of at least some of its assumptions. A
theoretical assessment of the precision and of possible deviations of the model can
be based on the underlying theory.
A mathematical metaphor postulates that “some complex range of phenomena
might be compared to a mathematical construction”. As an example, Manin men-
tions artificial intelligence with its “very complex systems which are processing
information because we have constructed them, and we are trying to compare them
with the human brain, which we do not understand very well – we do not understand
almost at all. So at the moment it is a very interesting mathematical metaphor,
and what it allows us to do mostly is to sort of cut out our wrong assumptions. If
we start comparing them with some very well-known reality, it turns out that they
would not work.”
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Clearly, Manin noted the deceptive formal similarity of the three ways of math-
ematization which are radically different with respect to their empirical foundation
and scientific status. He expressed concern about the lack of distinction and how
that may “influence our value systems”. In the words of [Bo91, p. 73]:
Well founded applied mathematics generates prestige which is inappropri-
ately generalized to support these quite different applications. The clarity
and precision of the mathematical derivations here are in sharp contrast to
the uncertainty of the underlying relations assumed. In fact, similarity of the
mathematical formalism involved tends to mask the differences in the scien-
tific extra-mathematical status, in the credibility of the conclusions and in
appropriate ways of checking assumptions and results... Mathematization can
– and therein lays its success – make existing rationality transparent; math-
ematization cannot introduce rationality to a system where it is absent... or
compensate for a deficit of knowledge.
Asked whether the last 30 years of mathematics’ consolidation raise the chance of
consolidation also in phenomenologically and metaphorically expanding sciences,
Manin hesitated to use such simplistic terms. He recalled the notion of Kolmogorov
complexity of a piece of information, which is, roughly speaking,
the length of the shortest programme, which can be then used to generate
this piece of information... Classical laws of physics – such phantastic laws
as Newton’s law of gravity and Einstein’s equations – are extremely short
programmes to generate a lot of descriptions of real physical world situations.
I am not at all sure that Kolmogorov’s complexity of data that were uncovered
by, say, genetics in the human genome project, or even modern cosmology data
... is sufficiently small that they can be really grasped by the human mind.
3. Medicine
3.1. The special place of medicine. Physicists of our time like to date the
physics’ beginning back to Galileo Galilei and his translation of measurable times
and distances on a skew plane into an abstract fall law. Before Galilei - and long
time after him, the methodological scientific status of what we would call mechanical
physics was quite low as compared with medicine. Physics was a purely empirical
subject. It was about precise series of observations and quantitative extrapolations.
It was the way to predict planetary positions, in particular eclipse times, the content
of silver in compounds, or the manpower required to lift a given weight with given
weight arm. It was accompanied and mixed up with all kinds of speculations about
the spirits and ghosts at work. We can easily see the continuity of results, of
observations and calculations from Kepler and Newton to our time. However, we
can hardly recognize anything in their thinking about physics, in the way they
connected physics with cosmic music or alchemy.
3.1.1. The maturity of medicine. Contrary to that, from the rich ancient litera-
ture preserved, see Diepgen [Di49], Kudlien [Ku67] and, in particular, Ju¨rss [Ju82,
312–315], we can see that the mind set in Greek medicine already from the fifth
century BCE was ours: instead of the partition (familiar from earlier and shaman
medicine and similar to the mind set preserved, as seen above, in physics until
recent times) into an empirical-rational branch (healing wounds) and a religious-
magic branch (cure inner diseases), a physiological concept emerged which focused
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on the patient as an individual organism within a population, with organs, liquids
and tissue, subjected to environmental and dietetic influences and, in principle,
open for unconfined investigation of functions, causal relations and the processive
course of diseases. In Hippocratic medicine, we meet for the first time the visible
endeavour after a rational surmounting of all problems related to body events.
With a shake of the head, we may read of Greek emphasis and speculations about
the body’s four liquids or other strange things, like when we recall today the verdict
of the medical profession 60 years ago against drinking water after doing sports and
under diarrhoea or their blind trust in antibiotics, not considering resistance aspects
at all. Contrary to physics, we have no continuity of results in medicine, but, also
contrary to physics, we have an outspoken continuity in mind set: no ghosts, no
metaphysical spirits are permitted to enter our explanations, diagnoses, prevention,
curation and palliation.
To me, medicine is a science that is characterized by maturity in thinking -
but, until now, of ephemeral quality of results. There are astonishing progresses
in the mathematization of biology and medicine of the last decades. There are
good reasons to expect that medicine will become the most important field of
mathematics application - as physics has been in the last centuries.
3.1.2. Hopeless aspects of medicine mathematization. Before proceeding with this
review, three warnings shall be presented. The first warning is taken from Jean le
Rond D’Alembert, Discours pre´liminaire to the Encyclope´die, [Al52, page vii]:
It must be confessed, however, that geometers sometimes abuse this appli-
cation of algebra to physics. Lacking appropriate experiments as a basis for
their calculations, they permit themselves to use hypotheses which are most
convenient, to be sure, but often very far removed from what really exists in
Nature. Some have tried to reduce even the art of curing to calculations, and
the human body, that most complicated machine, has been treated by our
algebraic doctors as if it were the simplest or the easiest one to reduce to its
component parts. It is a curious thing to see these authors solve with the
stroke of a pen problems of hydraulics and statics capable of occupying the
greatest geometers for a whole lifetime. As for us who are wiser or more timid,
let us be content to view most of these calculations and vague suppositions
as intellectual games to which Nature is not obliged to conform, and let us
conclude that the single true method of philosophizing as physical scientists
consists either in the application of mathematical analysis to experiments, or
in observation alone, enlightened by the spirit of method, aided sometimes by
conjectures when they can furnish some insights, but rigidly dissociated from
any arbitrary hypotheses.
This pompous verdict has not kept d’Alembert from contributing nine years later
a mathematical model to smallpox inoculation epidemiology which even today is
worth reading, see Dietz and Heesterbeek [DiHe02, Section 7].
A second warning against exaggerated expectations regarding the mathematiza-
tion of biology and medicine comes from the suspicion that many of the organs,
organelles and DNA sequence regions are evolutionary relicts without any active
function and with the only meaning to confuse the observer and the modeller.
A third warning relates to the conflict between reductionist and holistic ap-
proaches. We have seen a similar conflict in physics when discussing the chances
vs. vanity of the unifying approaches dating back to Einstein and re-actualized in
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various approaches to quantum gravity. For medicine it seems clear that a strictly
reductionist program is mandatory when we wish to replace ad-hoc assumptions by
reference to first principles. On the other side, there is no doubt that most body
functions and processes involve many parts of a cell, organ, and organism at the
same time. Understandably, the slogan of holistic Systems Biology has become very
popular and great expectations are attached to it. Both programs will disclose new
and interesting facts and features and offer mathematicians rich fields to work in.
To me, however, the most promising approach will be somewhere in between. Per-
haps focussed systems biology will prove to be able to hit the wall and make a hole
in the wall, i.e., a breakthrough. That is a medicine and biology discarding many
surely relevant aspects, lengths, distances, and focussing on a restricted, but multi-
level and multi-scale set of processes by applying a wide range of mathematical
methods and first physics principles. For an example see below Paragraph 3.2.3.
3.2. Populations, organisms, organs, cells, DNA. In this report, we shall try
to separate these levels wherever possible. On each level, quite different types of
mathematical methods are applied and quite different types of results obtained.
3.2.1. Populations. The intersection between humans and infectious diseases is per-
haps the most intensively studied problem in population biology (partly originating
in the actuarial literature, see the informative study [DiHe02]). Epidemiological
studies about the distribution of disease in human populations and the factors
determining that distribution, have shown to be useful in public health and preven-
tive medicine, in particular when not only the interference was based on statistical
methods but also the design of the data collection and the control of the reliability
of the reported data.
Perhaps the most important result of mathematical epidemiology has been the
statistical proof of the health risks of smoking - in spite of the great statistician
Ronald A. Fisher’s insistence that excess health problems and mortality of smokers
might have two other clever explanations, besides the common, namely that sub-
conscious feeling of early death might be the main reason of the desire to smoke or
that a predisposition to lung cancer and arterial diseases are genetically confounded
with the desire to smoke, see [Fi59] and recognized and ridiculed the evidence as
we would with the observed correlation between the occurrence of storks and the
frequency of birth in the Mark Brandenburg in the 1920s (German children are told
that the stork brings the babies in the same way as Anglo-Saxonic babies are found
under gooseberry bushes). It must be acknowledged that the work of R.A. Fisher
and his colleagues on correlation and regression analysis, goodness of fit, sampling
and statistical error in the first half of the 20th century had given epidemiology new
techniques of measurement and also undermined erroneous certainties. However, it
remains strange that Fisher in his polemic did not disclose his role as advisor to the
Tobacco Manufacturers Standing Committee nor admitted that a less libertarian
world view would support the statistical results and health recommendations by
Sir Richard Doll, the discoverer of the smoking correlation.
While main stream epidemiology has its greatest successes in identifying envi-
ronmental and behavioural factors, genetic epidemiology impresses by identifying
hereditary factors, in particular providing large panels of the most relevant sin-
gle nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) associating in selected diseases. Recently, a
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SNP whole genome scan has been carried out on 1599 patients with type 2 dia-
betes and 1503 control subjects matched from Finland and Sweden, mapping loci
for various elements of metabolic syndrome, see also Groop et al. [Gr07]. While
genotyping now begins to become rather straight forward, it often remains unclear
how to translate the new information into theoretical analysis of the disease and to
design new strategies for early diagnosis (perhaps not at all always desirable) and
treatment, see also below Paragraph 3.2.3.
Another branch of epidemiology are the SIR models for infectious diseases. For
teaching qualitative reasoning and numerical analysis of coupled non-linear differen-
tial equation, the modelling of Susceptibles, Infectives and Removed, respectively,
Resistents have been a beloved dull for decades: a toy of pure mathematics and
applied terminology like a sheep in wolf’s clothing.
The power of SIR models became evident, however, in controversies about vacci-
nation schemes against Rubella, where the models could predict that non-vaccination
would be more safe than non-compulsory vaccination below the critical level of cov-
erage and Greece had to pay for not listening to the predictions, [AnMa91, pp. 77-
79, 102-110, 152f, 167f, 188-199]. Modified SIR models have also proved applicable
for estimating various factors for the spread (respectively, control) of Methicillin
Resistant Staphylococcus aurea (MRSA): the role of antibiotic consumption, the role
of isolation and other sanitary procedures in hospitals, the comparative weights of
entrance and exit screening to keep the community pool down, etc., see [BBD06].
It seems that long-time oscillations and rapidly mutating vira like the HIV virus
or the bird flu H5N1 still challenge mathematicians and evolutionary epidemiolo-
gists due to the non-linar aspects of the processes. Moreover, it seems necessary
and possible by advances in computing, to replace the SIR models by time-series
SIR (TSIR). Here the point is to drop the homogeneous-mixing assumption and to
admit that not all hosts have identical rates of disease-causing contacts, see Grenfell
& collaborators [BGM07].
3.2.2. Organisms and organs. To give one (outstanding) example, we refer to the
modelling of the cardio-vascular system, [OtDa00]. As discussed above in paragraph
2.1.3, computer supported modelling can provide the most beautiful animations.
However, modelling can have other goals: explaining strange, but well-established
phenomena (e.g., that the forces exercised by the heart are slightly below the forces
measured by the blood stream); supporting heart surgery and implantations; and
tuning anaesthesia simulators for the training of anaesthesiologists. For these goals,
the reliability of the modelling’s basic assumptions has shown to be decisive. Com-
pared with the most smashing animations, modelling the cardio-vascular system
like a sewage system with elastic walls may sound primitive. However, it gains its
reliability by its firm foundation on first principles.
3.2.3. Cells. The mathematization of the cell has many levels and many scales.
To give an example, I shall describe an evolving - focussed - systems biology of
regulated exocytosis in pancreatic β-cells, mostly based on [BLR08]. These cells
are responsible for the appropriate insulin secretion. Insufficient mass or function
of these cells characterize Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes mellitus (T1DM, T2DM).
Similar secretion processes happen in nerve cells. However, characteristic times
for insulin secretion are between 5 and 30 minutes, while the secretion of neuro-
transmitters is in the millisecond range. Moreover, the length of a β-cell is hardly
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exceeding 3000 nanometres (nm), while nerve cells have characteristic lengths in
the cm and meter range. So, processes in β-cells are more easy to observe than
processes in nerve cells, but they are basically comparable.
It seems that comprehensive research on β-cell function and mass has been seri-
ously hampered for 80 years because of the high efficiency of the symptomatic treat-
ment of T1DM and T2DM by insulin injection. Recent advances - and promises - of
nanotechnology suggest the following radically new research agenda, to be executed
first on cell lines, then on cell tissue of selected rodents, finally on living human
cells:
1. Synthesize magneto-luminescent nanoparticles; develop a precisely working elec-
tric device, which is able to generate a properly behaving electromagnetic field;
measure cytoskeletal viscosity and detect the interaction with organelles and actin
filaments by optical tracking of the forced movement of the nanoparticles. Diffi-
culties to overcome: protect against protein adsorption by suitable coating of the
particles and determine the field strength necessary to distinguish the forced move-
ment from the underlying Brownian motion.
2. Synthesize luminescent nanoparticles with after-glow property (extended du-
ration of luminescence and separation of excitation and light emission); dope the
nanoparticles with suitable antigens and attach them to selected organelles to track
intra-cellular dynamics of the insulin granules.
3. Develop a multipurpose sensor chip and measure all electric phenomena (varying
potential over the plasma membrane, the bursts of Ca++ ion oscillations, and
changing impedances on the surface of the plasma membrane for precise chronical
order of relevant secretion events.
4. Describe the details of the bilayer membrane-granule fusion event (with the hard
numerical problems of the meso scale, largely exceeding the well-functioning scales
of molecular dynamics).
5. Connect the preceding dynamic and geometric data with reaction-diffusion data.
Connect the preceding dynamic and geometric data with genetic data.
Develop clinical and pharmaceutical applications:
• Quality control of transplants for T1DM patients.
• Testing drug components for β-cell repair.
• Testing nanotoxicity and drug components for various cell types.
• Early in-vivo diagnosis by enhanced gastroscopy.
• Develop mild forms of gene therapy for patients with over-expressed major
type 2-diabetes gene TCF7L2 by targeting short interfering RNA sequences
(siRNAs) to the β-cells, leading to degradation of excess mRNA transcript.
(This strategy may be difficult to implement, due to the degradation of free
RNA in the blood and the risk of off-target effects.)
We shall not go into the mathematical details of the involved compartment mod-
els, free boundary theory, reaction-diffusion equations, data analysis etc. Summing
up, the mathematization can help design relevant experiments and support the
determination of basic parameters. Mathematical modelling and simulation can
point to possible new phenomena or new relations which have to be confirmed and
investigated more thoroughly in the laboratory. However, at the present state of
our knowledge about cell and cell membrane processes, one must doubt whether
making predictions in silico can really replace experiments in vivo or in vitro.
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4. Economics
While a holistic unifying view in physics has a smell of vanity (in spite of efforts in
quantum gravity) and the time has hardly come for a holistic all-embracing systems
biology programme in medicine, a rational point of departure for economics, in
particular under the present crisis, can only be a systems view.
On the one side we have the relief of breaking the growth curve which has been
depriving future generations of non-renewable resources. In some parts of the world
we can say “Enough is enough”. We can choose a conscious way of living, we can
replace purely quantitative scales for the quality of life, like GNP, money, work
places, hospital beds and spending power by other social and individual values like
health, peace, prosperity, happiness. We can look to Cuba or other model countries
who have shown how to live with dramatically restricted energy consumption - if a
lot more should go wrong.
On the other side we must worry that the crisis, like the Great Depression of
1929-1945, see [Ki73] will deepen the differences between rich and poor within and
between countries, and can foster unprecedented political and military catastrophes.
Many scientific subjects are challenged to give explanation and advice in the
present crisis. We would be grateful for relief in understanding what is going on,
and qualified warning would be needed against leaving the required decisions to the
isolated world of so-called decision makers or chief advisors and chief economists.
Perhaps not mathematical economics is needed (see, however, the recent ex-post
analyses [CCFS09]), but rather psychology which is proficient in how individuals
and masses experience crises, or philosophy which should be proficient on the rela-
tion between property and lack of sense of responsibility.
What can a mathematician add to the avalanche of crisis comments in the lit-
erature? Where are the pitfalls and sins and where the chances of mathematical
modelling in economics and finance under the present crisis?
4.1. Praise and criticism of greed and accountability. In laborious analysis
of hundred thousands of figures and tables, the classic socialist thinkers, culminat-
ing with Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, have shown that capitalism builds on,
supports and develops Rechenhaftigkeit – accountability, and that abstract greed,
greed for more money, greed for more profit, is the most powerful and progressive
aspect of capitalism. They advocated for another society where decisions, human
relations, development should not be driven by greed but by conscious and debated
choices. That makes sense. But clinging to capitalism, though preferably without
greed, is media hype and logical non-sense.
One does not need relatively advanced macro-economical predictive models to
see that greed, while driving economic growth and economisation of (many, not all)
resources, generates contradictions. It generates abundance of free capital in the
presence of unsatisfied consumption wishes and deepens the social divide. Under
this perspective, it was not at all unreasonable by the US-American Federal Bank
to admit the application of subprime loans of questionable security: many young
men of US-American lower middle class were risking health and life in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As Alan Greenspan confessed: under the given circumstances, the
subprime loans were necessary. It gave more people a stake in the future of our
country and boded well for the cohesion of the nation in a country at war, [Gr07,
Chapter 11]!
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In many comments, the so-called neo-classical economic equilibrium theory is
blamed for having closed the eyes of politicians and bankers in front of the upcom-
ing crisis. Mathematical economics can, in deed, be blamed for many misleading
concepts, statements and predictions. Mathematical models have had their share
in moving the focus from basic contradictions in the sectors of production and con-
sumption (private daily and luxury requirements and state and military expendi-
tures, i.e.,Main Street) over into the sphere of circulation (Wall Street) proliferating
for much too long the impression that the financial crisis was only a problem for
banks and pension funds. No doubt, floods of money and signs are more easy to
quantify and mathematize than the state and development of productive forces and
production relations.
However, mathematical models can not really be blamed for the crisis. The crisis
was there, it was open, it was visible, and one reacted correctly according to the
conditions of capitalism - and made so the crisis to deepen and to propagate into a
broader crisis.
Now, the system-immanent rational continues when greed and state power are
merged in an unprecedented way and huge and almost free self-service tables are
provided for poisoned capital on the verge of bankruptcy. Once again, it’s clearly
the correct answer within a context which is considered as fixed. Consequently, one
must be afraid that these help packages will further deepen the crisis, at least for a
time to come until the financial markets will regain a certain transparency and will
show their force to clean-up the mess - with sacrifices of yet unknown magnitude
and composition to be offered to the gods.
4.2. Hedging and the fight for security. Mathematical modelling in finance
and economics has not only greed, growth and profit as variables to predict and
optimize, but also the security of investments, the safety of an portfolio of private
investors, hedge funds and pension funds. Actually, mathematicians, actuaries
and mathematically trained economists can make calculations that appear valid,
credible and trustworthy. Thirty years ago, there were only two mathematicians
employed by finance in the whole of Denmark. Since a couple of years, often more
than half of a year of graduates in math and physics end up there.
Credit evaluation and fixing prices of new financial creations is so intricate that
parts of the most modern mathematics, e.g., martingales and heat equation, are
challenged. In normal situations, the calculations hold. That’s the way they are
calibrated. These calculations have had, admittedly, their part in conjuring false
security. It is ironical that the mathematicians were employed for enhancing the
security of investments by modelling. However, by making the trade with options
and other financial derivates more just, more reliable, more easy, we have also
created a machine that can magnify and worsen a developing crisis by market
automatics. See also Krickeberg [Kr08] on the one hand, and on the other Carmona
& Sircar [CaSi09].
4.3. Soft selection instead of control of the irrational? In discussions about
the crisis one often hears the words complexity, uncertainty, control and chaos.
In mathematics we know many very simple, even deterministic systems that are
absolutely unpredictable as long as they are permitted to follow their own way.
Take the double pendulum: it can turn somersaults. Small, practically invisible
differences decide whether there comes one somersault more. Unpredictable? Yes.
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Uncontrollable? Yes - unless we put a sufficiently narrow box around the pendulum.
Then no further somersaults will come. Perhaps such a box should be built for our
economic systems as well, sooner or later.
As discussed in the previous chapters, mathematical models are, perhaps like
all science, able to predict concrete events (like eclipses and election results) and
consequences of performed operations (e.g., when we put on the light at the switch).
Mathematics and science, however, can do that in ideally-simple cases only. In
complex cases, we will be lucky if we at least can point to necessary changes,
confinements, regulations to create a predictable and adjustable system. Instead
of the possibly vain goals of controlling an irrational system we may consider to
soften our system of goal functions. In the long run, soft selection and redesign of
priorities and ways of cooperation, as explained in [Ga89], will be the most efficient
way to peace and prosperity. To me, that is the only proved theorem of this paper.
5. General trends of mathematization and modelling
5.1. Deep divide. Regarding the power and the value of mathematization, there
is a deep moral divide both within the mathematics community and the public.
On the one side, we have the outspoken science and math optimism of out-
standing thinkers: Henri Poincare´’s Nature not only suggests to us problems, she
suggests their solution; David Hilbert’s Wir mu¨ssen wissen; wir werden wissen -
We must know; we will know of his Speech in Ko¨nigsberg in 1930, now on his
tomb in Go¨ttingen; or Bertolt Brecht’s vision of mathematical accountability in
Die Tage der Kommune [Br45] of 1945: “Das ist die Kommune, das ist die Wis-
senschaft, das neue Jahrtausend... - That is the Commune, that is the science, the
new millennium...”). We have astonishing evidence that many mathematization
concepts either appear to us as natural and a-priori, or they use to emerge as clear
over time. We have the power and validity of extremely simple concepts, as in
dimension analysis, consistency requirements and gauge invariance of mathemati-
cal physics. Progressive movements emphasize science and education in liberation
movements and developing countries. Humanitarian organizations (like WHO and
UNICEF) preach science and technology optimism in confronting mass poverty and
epidemics.
On the other side, deep limitation layers of science and mathematical thinking
have been dogged up by Kurt Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem for sufficiently rich
arithmetic systems, Andrei N. Kolmogorov’s Complexity Theory, and Niels Bohr’s
notion of Complementarity. Incomprehensibility and lack of regularity continue to
hamper trustworthy mathematization. Peter Lax [La08, p. 142] writes about the
profound mystery of fluids, though recognizing that different approaches lead to
remarkable coincidence results, supporting reliability.
The abstruseness of the mathematical triumphs of the hydrogen bomb is com-
monplace. The wide-spread trust in superiority and invincibility, based on math-
ematical war technology like high precision bombing, has proved to be even more
vicious for warriors and victims than the immediate physical impact of the very
math-based weaponry, recently also in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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In between the two extremes, we have the optimistic scepticism of Eugene
Wigner’s unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics, but also Jacob Schwartz’s ver-
dict against the pernicious influence of mathematics on science and Albert Ein-
stein’s demand for finding the central questions against the dominance of the beau-
tiful and the difficult.
5.2. Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotic view. From the times of Niels Bohr,
many physicists, mathematicians and biologists have been attentive to philosoph-
ical aspects of our doing. Most of us are convinced that the frontier situation
of our research can point to aspects of some philosophical relevance - if only the
professional philosophers would take the necessary time to become familiar with
our thinking. Seldom, however, we read something of the philosophers which can
inspire us.
The US-American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is an ad-
mirable exception. In his semiotics and pragmaticist (he avoids the word “prag-
matic”) thinking, he provides a wealth of ideas, spread over an immense life work.
It seems to me that many of his ideas, comments, and concepts can shed light on
the why and how of mathematization. Here I shall only refer some thoughts of
Peirce’s The Fixation of Belief from 1877, see [Pe77].
My fascination of Peirce’s text is, in particular, based on the following observa-
tions which may appear trivial (or known from Friedrich Engels), but are necessary
to repeat many times for the new-modeller:
1. For good and bad, we are all equipped with innate (or spontaneous) orientation,
sometimes to exploit, sometimes to subdue. Our innate orientation is similar to the
habits of animals in our familiar neighbourhood. We are all ”logical machines”.
2. However, inborn logic is not sufficient in foreign (new) situations. For such situa-
tions, we need methods how to fixate our beliefs. Peirce distinguishes four different
methods. All four have mathematical aspects and are common in mathematical
modelling.
Tenacity: is our strength not to become confused, not to be blown away by
unfounded arguments, superficial objections, misleading examples, though
sometimes keeping our ears locked for too long.
Authority: of well-established theories and results is what we tend to believe
in and have to stick to. We will seldom drop a mastered approach in favour
of something new and unproved.
Discussion: can hardly help to overcome a belief built on tenacity or author-
ity.
Consequences: have to be investigated in all modelling. At the end of the
day, they decide whether we become convinced of the validity of our ap-
proach (Peirce’s Pragmaticist Maxim).
3. The main tool of modelling (i.e., the fixation of belief by mathematical argu-
ments) is the transformation of symbols (signals, observations, segments of reality)
into a new set of symbols (mathematical equations, models and descriptions). The
advantage for the modeller, for the person to interpret the signs, is that signs which
are hard or humid and difficult to collect in one hand can be replaced by signs which
we can write and manipulate.
4. The common mapping cycle reality → model → validation is misleading. The
quality of a mathematical model is not how similar it is to the segment of reality
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under consideration, but whether it provides a flexible and goal-oriented approach,
opening for doubts and indicating ways for the removal of doubts (later trivialized
by Popper’s falsification claim). More precisely, Peirce claims
Be aware of differences between different approaches!
Try to distinguish different goals (different priorities) of modelling as precise as
possible!
Investigate whether different goals are mutually compatible, i.e., can be reached
simultaneously!
Behave realistically! Don’t ask: How well does the model reflect a given segment
of the world? But ask: Does this model of a given segment of the world support the
wanted and possibly wider activities / goals better than other models?
5.3. Integral geometry, for ever. Perhaps a brief summary of the history of
integral geometry, from Cavalieri’s Principle to Harmonic Analysis, Characteristic
Classes, Point Processes, and Stochastic Geometry could illustrate some of Peirce’s
points and explain the origin and development of far-reaching mathematical con-
cepts, the power of mathematization, from gauge theoretic physics to the counting
of brain cells, and the continuing and deepening limitations of mathematization
over urging problems, be it the limitations of mathematical concepts like homo-
topy invariance (when confronted with spectral invariants) or limitations due to
peculiarities of the subject domain. There is more to discuss.
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